Jon Milani

“Intention” and “Structure”; an Historiographical Analysis of Nazi Foreign Policy

Historians have taken a particular interest in understanding the course of Nazi pre-war foreign policy.[1] Historical debate has primarily been focused on determining whether such policy was guided by a consistent programme or if it was affected by various “structural determinants”. Concurrent debate has centred on Hitler’s role in the course of foreign policy. According to “intentionalist” interpretations, Hitler not only espoused ideologically-based expansionist aspirations before his rise to power, but he actively directed foreign policy in order to achieve his aims. Most historians have taken some degree of an “intentionalist” interpretation; however, whether Hitler relied on an explicit stage-by-stage programme, or whether he was primarily opportunistic, remains a subject of debate. Similarly, historians have debated whether Hitler’s focus extended beyond the continent toward global aspirations. By contrast, more recent “polycratic-pluralist” and “structuralist” interpretations question Hitler’s primacy in determining the course of Nazi foreign policy. Rather, these historians suggest that Hitler’s aims were relatively unspecific, as much the result of the Nazi Party’s radical, decentralized momentum as Hitler’s opportunistic character. Given the degree of debate among historians, a “synthesis” approach combining elements of “intention” and “structure” seems most appropriate. Nazi foreign policy was affected by “structural determinants” and by Hitler’s opportunism; however, foreign policy was also directed by a general programme, underpinned by Hitler’s consistent ideological convictions.

Following its rise to power in 1933, the Nazi Party instituted a “revisionist” foreign policy, which aimed at reversing restrictions placed on Germany by the Treaties of Versailles.[2] The post-war treaties, the occupation of former German territories, and the reparations imposed on Germany were held in contempt not only by the Nazis, but by the Völkisch Right as well as large pockets of German society. For “fundamental forces” historians, political, economic, and social forces in Germany were responsible not only for the rise of the Nazis but for affecting the course of foreign policy as well.[3] Given the popularity of “revisionist” policies, it is not altogether unreasonable to assume that the Nazis’ early policy-course was taken for pragmatic reasons. Even before 1933, the Nazis understood that a rejection of the much despised foreign policy of the Weimar government (largely defined by Versailles) would help to secure middle class electoral appeal, an important consideration for the consolidation of power.[4] Furthermore, support for the Nazis increased with Germany’s continued economic decline during the late 1920s and early 1930s, which reparation payments exacerbated.[5] Many historians argue that “revisionist” forces played a central role in affecting Nazi foreign policy. The Nazis’ willingness to support “revisionist” policies was at least partially due to their desire to seize on popular support. Furthermore, some historians advocate “continuity” between the Nazis and previous German governments.[6] According to Alan Taylor, Hitler’s continental aspirations were simply a continuation of expansionist desires in the Bismarckian and Wilhelmine eras.[7] Similarly, Woodruff Smith argues that the Lebensraum requirement – often cited as a central aspect of Hitler’s ideology – has a rich and well documented pan-German history.[8]

Contrary to the “fundamental forces-continuity” approach, many historians advocate an “intentionalist” interpretation of Nazi foreign policy, recognizing Hitler’s role in setting the course of immediate “revisionism” and in a broader expansionist focus. In terms of the Nazis’ early foreign policy orientation, debate has centred on whether Hitler operated according to ideological convictions or instead acted “opportunistically” by seizing on popular support of restorative policies. As a result of the work of Hugh Trevor-Roper and Eberhard Jäckel, historians generally recognizes the centrality of Hitler’s ideology in foreign policy decision-making after 1933.[9] As Ian Kershaw notes, Hitler operated with a notable degree of rigidity in adhering to his basic foreign policy principles.[10] For “intentionalists”, the impetus of Hitler’s foreign policy aims can be found in Mein Kampf, where he presented a worldview that hinged on German racial struggle and eastward territorial expansion.[11] Arguably, Taylor is mistaken to diminish the influence of Hitler’s ideological convictions on Nazi foreign policy.[12] Hitler’s foreign policy maneuvering was at least in part driven by short-term “revisionist” aims; however, there is little doubt of Hitler’s long-term and relatively consistent ideological focus as the primary driving force in Nazi foreign policy aims.[13] According to Kershaw, his ideological determinism was fully formed by the writing of Mein Kampf in 1924, which was more fully articulated in his unpublished Zweites Buch, where he envisaged Germany’s victory over western Europe and eastern territorial expansion at the expense of Russia.[14] Like Trevor-Roper and Jäckel, Andreas Hillgruber argues that Hitler’s early writings demonstrate the formulation of a well-developed programme that centred on German aggression.[15]

According to Kershaw, Nazi foreign policy took significant steps of departure from conventional “revisionism” by Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in October 1933 and in the reversals in relations with Poland and Russia during the following year.[16] For “intentionalist” historians, the culmination of these policies demonstrates Hitler’s often dominant role in foreign policy maneuvering. Hitler’s desire to foster improved relations with Poland was not unanimously endorsed; his aims ran contrary to those of Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath, who argued that rapprochement with Poland was neither possible nor desirable.[17] However, Hitler’s diplomatic policy-course was not without pragmatic benefits. Not only did rapprochement encourage improved trade relations (to the elation of many German industrialists), but it provided a practical bilateral countermeasure to multilateral pacts that might otherwise threaten German ambitions.[18] According to Christian Leitz, however, Hitler’s sought rapprochement with Poland primarily because Germany was not militarily prepared to begin its territorial expansion.[19] Consequently, rapprochement provided the guise of conciliation. It also provided another practical benefit: it allowed for a plebiscite in the Saarland, which resulted in an overwhelming majority of voters opting to join the Reich.[20] As Hitler promoted rapprochement with Poland, he allowed Soviet relations to deteriorate. While this policy complemented Hitler’s anti-Bolshevik sentiments, it took place against the initial concerns of the German Foreign Ministry and Soviet diplomats.[21] It also undermined the mutual advantage of improved relations that successive German ambassadors Herbert von Dirksen and Rudolf Nadolny attempted to promote.[22] In the face of diplomatic convention and opportunism, Hitler appeared to favour his own ideological sentiments, the consequences of which pushed Soviet Russia closer to France.[23]

For Kershaw, the centrality of Hitler’s role in foreign policy was never more apparent than in respect of his influence on relations with Britain.[24] During the 1930s, Hitler attempted to foster improved diplomacy with Britain, an aim which hinged on his contention that Britain shared Germany’s historical distaste for France.[25] Concerned with France’s continental supremacy, Hitler conveyed to the French that he hoped to promote friendly relations.[26] However, an alliance with Britain would provide a counter-balance balance to France, whose strength threatened Germany’s ambitions.[27] In order to assure that talks with London went favourably, Hitler named his foreign political advisor Joachin von Ribbentrop as special Minister Plenipotentiary for the German Reich.[28] Besides initiating the process of improved relations with Britain, the negotiation of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935 demonstrates Hitler’s intention to appear moderate, a maneuver undoubtedly designed to draw Britain closer to an alliance.[29] For Kershaw, the fulfillment of the bilateral naval treaty is another indicator of Hitler’s decisive role in the Nazis’ foreign policy relations with Britain.[30] Criticism from the German foreign ministry and the navy, signs of Britain’s growing disinterest in the idea, and the absence of support from economic interest groups meant that Hitler and Ribbentrop were instrumental in realizing the treaty.[31]

Combined with Hitler’s “intentionalism”, many historians presume that the course of Nazi foreign policy was directed by a consistent and well-developed programme.[32] According to Kershaw, this “programmatic” argument has become the dominant theory in Nazi foreign policy.[33] The theory hinges on the presumption that Hitler operated with both consistency and totality in determining the course of foreign policy. As early as Mein Kampf, Hitler claimed that a foreign policy that sought merely to restore Germany’s pre-war borders served neither the German people nor the nation’s future.[34] Rather, in his writings he envisaged a unified Germany’s hegemony over Europe by means of war.[35] For Werner Maser, Hitler’s subsequent foreign policy programme advocated the conquest of territory and the unquestioned sovereignty for the German Reich.[36] According to Milan Hauner, Hitler’s racial ideology also played a decisive role in his foreign policy programme; his desire for eastern living space advocated annihilation of the Jews and total submission of Russian Bolshevism.[37] Takeing the analysis further, historian Hillgruber argues that Hitler directed foreign policy according to a Stufenplan (three-stage plan) that moved from the continent to the far east, and eventually to the rest of the world.[38] This “world dominion” theory has been expanded upon by Klaus Hildebrand, who makes note of the seriousness of Germany’s colonial policies.[39] For Hauner, Hitler’s supremacy in the Reich meant that he was not only the architect of the Nazis’ foreign policy programme, but he was also “its chief animator”.[40] However, Rich notes that even the most strident “programmatic” scholars recognize that Hitler operated with a necessary degree of fluctuation, often seizing on opportunities.[41]

In Zweites Buch, Hitler speculated on theoretical maneuvers that Germany might take in order to dominate the continent. He believed that Germany would eliminate France by way of alliances with Britain and Italy, and that Russia would be overthrown in order to provide Germany with sufficient eastern living-space.[42] Although historians debate whether Hitler’s early writings represent the outline of a stage-by-stage plan or merely a loose ideological framework, Hitler’s role in directing the course of early foreign policy was clear.[43] Similarly, his consistent advocacy for aggressive German expansion was equally apparent (although perhaps only in hindsight). Hitler’s unbending desire for war explains his early attempts to court the army leadership, as well as the army leadership’s often tumultuous relationship with the Party (largely affected by the rise of the SS as a de-facto fourth branch of the military, and due to racial policies in the east) during the mid and latter years of the Third Reich.[44] In the early 1930s, however, Hitler not only advocated the importance of the armed forces, but promised to commit the full force of the German economy to rearmament.[45] What followed was total economic coordination at every level of government.[46] Not only did the Nazis use legal measures to take control of German enterprise, but they also dissolved the trade and labor unions.[47] As Kershaw notes, the culmination of work and armaments programmes, and cooperation from the Reichsbank sent rearmament into a stratospheric rise in 1934.[48] The Nazis also embarked on a massive propaganda campaign in order to convey peaceful intentions and, presumably, to justify Germany’s activity while disguising its real aims.[49]

According to Kershaw, strictly “intentionalist” interpretations of Nazi foreign policy often succumb to “Hitlerist” interpretation, emphasizing Hitler’s totality in the Reich.[50] In defence of Hitler’s primacy, Gerhard Weinberg argues that Hitler’s opposition either conceded agreement or retreated into silence.[51] For Hauner, Hitler was so central to German foreign policy that “Hitler” and “Germany” are appropriately used interchangeably to describe foreign policy maneuvering.[52] By contrast, “structuralist” historians have questioned Hitler’s dominance in foreign policy decision-making, as well as the absolution of Hitler’s programmatic thrust. Although “structuralists” do not deny Hitler’s pronounced role in foreign policy decision-making, these historians reject the existence of an explicit foreign policy programme, and diminish the centrality of Hitler’s ideological convictions as the catalyst for Nazi foreign policy maneuvering.[53] Furthermore, “structuralists” challenge the “intentionalist” emphasis on Hitler’s autonomy, citing pressure from interest groups like the army leadership and industrial players, as well as the disarray of the Party and the institutional chaos of the government.[54] Many “structuralist” historians point to Hitler’s often spontaneous response to internal and external pressures.[55] This is similar to Taylor’s contention, who argues that Hitler was merely an unprincipled opportunist.[56] Hans Mommsen takes a more cynical view, arguing that Hitler not only responded spontaneously, but that many developments were altogether beyond his control.[57] As Kershaw notes, the course of Nazi foreign policy was affected by a range of “structural determinants”: domestic upheaval, various economic pressures, the consequences of Hitler’s “charismatic leadership”, and the relative strength of other European powers all affected the Nazis’ policy course.[58]

The Nazis’ decision to reoccupy the Rhineland seems to indicate the effects of internal “structural determinants” on foreign policy decision-making. For Kershaw, domestic and diplomatic pressures played a notable role in encouraging German reoccupation of the Rhineland.[59] Furthermore, reoccupation had been under abstract consideration by the army and the foreign ministry as early as 1934, and the issue was revived following the French-Soviet pact of May 1935.[60] However, the theatrical nature of immediate reoccupation rather than the lengthier process of negotiations points to Hitler’s direct involvement in the decision.[61] Furthermore, the expedience of Hitler’s decision meant that a consensus issue became a divisive one. While Ribbentrop and Joseph Goebbels favoured immediate reoccupation, Werner von Blomberg and other army officials were less enthusiastic.[62] German generals warned Hitler that French retaliation could result in national humiliation or worse for Germany.[63] Hitler shared some of the military’s concern: he ordered German troops moving into the Rhineland on March 7, 1936 to evacuate should France mobilize.64 Despite Hitler’s concern, his gamble proved successful; the French and British governments protested the aggression but did nothing to counter it.[65] Hitler justified the provocation as a response to growing French-Soviet relations, which he followed up by negotiating a series of agreements and treaties to ensure Germany’s security.[66] Although reoccupation of the Rhineland was influenced by “structural determinants”, Hitler’s expediency, without the full support of the military, indicates an undeniable degree of “intentionalism”. As Norman Rich notes, the success of the Rhineland reoccupation served only to increase Hitler’s contempt for Germany’s conservative leadership while stoking his confidence in the superiority of his judgement.[67]

Hitler’s triumphant Rhineland seizure also opened up new foreign policy opportunities, especially concerning Austria. Hitler had envisaged the union of Germany and Austria as early as Mein Kampf, and directed foreign policy maneuvering during the 1930s to that end.[68] With his ministers and heads of the armed forces, Hitler considered a number of maneuvers whereby Austria could be brought into the Reich, including by way of a Nazi shadow government.[69] Hitler also levied political and economic pressures against Austria; however, his pursuit of Austria proved to be a divisive force in Italian-German relations thanks to Austria’s close ties with the Italians, and as a result Hitler was forced to ease his aggressive Austrian policy-course.[70] Furthermore, the Austrian Nazis’ the failed coup d’etat in July 1934 meant that Hitler was forced to turn his attention to other matters: namely encouraging new overtures with Italy.[71] As early as Zweites Buch, Hitler envisaged the benefits of a German-Italian alliance.[72] He contended that France and Italy were natural enemies, and that a German-Italian alliance would prove valuable in undermining French continental authority.[73] For “programmatic” historians, Hitler’s pursuit of improved Italian relations was consistent with his foreign policy programme. Hitler’s support for Mussolini during the post-Abyssinian diplomatic fallout drew Italy and Germany toward an alliance.[74] Hitler’s interest in self-determination for South Tyrol Germans had the potential to strain relations; however, Hitler recognized the benefits of an alliance with Italy offered the greater prospect of weakening France’s position.[75] It also presented an opportunity for the eventual annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.[76]

Although many historians posit Hitler’s supremacy in foreign policy decision-making, a vein of more recent scholarship has taken to “polycratic” or “pluralist” interpretations of Nazi foreign policy.[77] According to such interpretations, Hitler’s intentions do not entirely explain the course of policy. Rather, “polycratic-pluralist” historians generally argue that decision-making was as much the result of chance decisions as long-term planning.[78] For historian Wolfgang Schieder, the decision-making process that involved Germany in the Spanish Civil War was both primarily determined by Hermann Göring’s interest in acquiring Spanish raw materials and by elements of the Party, working against the recommendations of the German foreign ministry.[79] However, according to Hildebrand, the German Foreign Office was at a loss to explain the expediency of Hitler’s affirmation of support for Franco, indicating his directed involvement in decision-making.[80] According to Hildebrand, Hitler’s expansionist aims superseded regional economic interests; Hitler’s support of Franco was primarily offered in order to strengthen Germany’s strategic base in its expansionist thrust.[81] Conversely, Kershaw argues that Hitler’s turn toward Spain was caused primarily by his perception of the looming threat of continental Bolshevism.[82] Furthermore, Rich notes that German support for Franco was more palatable to the British than Stalin’s support of the Spanish Republican government.[83] Hitler was also provided an opportunity to strengthen German-Italian relations during the Spanish conflagration.[84] Thus, Hitler’s decision-making appears to be a mix of “polycratic-pluralist” influences as well as some degree of an “intentionalist” thrust. In any event, Germany’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War was “the catalyst for a major power-shift in Europe”, and indicated that Germany had become a highly destabilizing force in the delicate international order.[85]

At first blush, Hitler’s hesitancy to address the still unresolved Austrian question seems to indicate “polycratic” pressures in the Reich leadership and the dilution of Hitler’s “programmatic” convictions. In the immediate aftermath of the Anschluß crisis of March 1938, it was Göring and Georg Keppler who pushed the pace of Austrian annexation.[86] However, Rich argues that Hitler’s desire to incorporate Austria into the Reich remained a consistent foreign policy aim from the early 1930s.[87] Furthermore, Kershaw argues that Göring and Keppler operated under the assumption that Hitler intended to act on the Austrian question in short order.[88] As David Welch notes of Kershaw’s work, competing agencies in the Party as well as the bureaucracy operated always under the assumption that they were fulfilling the Führer’s wishes (expressed or implied).[89] While Hitler did not play the dominant role in resolving the Austrian question, his omnipotence in the decision-making process seems evident. However, the accidental conclusion to the Austrian question might indicate that Hitler – and by extension the Party and the bureaucracy – did not always operate according to well-defined foreign policy blueprints.[90] Given the inherent unpredictability and spontaneity of foreign relations, the suggestion that Hitler employed a stage-by-stage programme is less convincing; such a claim cannot reconcile Hitler’s opportunism, nor instances of hesitancy on his part. As Rich notes, even the most strident “programmatic” scholars recognize that Hitler operated with a necessary degree of fluctuation.[91]

According to Trevor-Roper, Hitler remained consistently dedicated to a general foreign policy programme that sought German hegemony and the acquisition of sufficient eastern living-space.[92] For Hildebrand, Hitler’s advocacy for annexation of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia demonstrates his consistent adherence to that programme.[93] By the end of 1936, Ribbentrop’s best efforts to form an alliance with Britain had failed; however, Hitler was convinced that Britain would not provoke war by intervening in the Sudetenland crisis that the Nazis successfully precipitated.[94] Following a series of diplomatic maneuvers under the threat of military intervention, in March 1938 the Nazis successfully occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia (and, to some surprise, without provoking war).[95] As Hitler turned his attention to Poland, however, war in Europe was inevitable.[96] For many historians, Hitler’s eastward march was always focused on precipitating war in order to secure living-space in Soviet Russia.[97] However, historians debate whether living-space acquisition represented Hitler’s final aims, or if it was a stage in a programme of world mastery. While “continentalist” historians like Trevor-Roper argue that Hitler’s final aims were focused only on eastern living-space, “globalists” like Hildebrand and Hauner, among others, argue that Hitler consistently advocated world dominion for the Reich.[98] However, Kershaw is less convinced of the “world mastery” thesis; although Hitler mused about Germany’s Latin American interests and contemplated war with the United States, these aims were utopian and inconsistent, without long-term rational planning.[99] It would seem that Hitler’s pre-war foreign policy programme – as a general ideological framework – was limited to the European continent.

Third Reich historians have debated a number of aspects of pre-war Nazi foreign policy. Primarily, historians have been concerned with determining whether Nazi foreign policy was directed by a programme or if its course was the by-product of “structural determinants”, including popular “revisionist” sentiments in the Reich. Historical debate has also focused on determining Hitler’s role in the course of foreign policy. Many historians advocate Hitler’s “intentionalism” in directing Nazi foreign policy; where Hitler did not play the predominant role in the decision-making process, elements of the fractured Nazi leadership acted on his behalf. Furthermore, the “function” of Hitler’s leadership also encouraged cooperation by competing interest groups, always operating according to the Führer’s wishes. Although many historians advocate the existence of Hitler’s general foreign policy programme, it is less clear whether specific policy decisions were directed by planning, or if they were taken out of opportunism. Conversely, “polycratic-pluralist” and “structuralist” historians argue that Hitler’s aims were not directed by a foreign policy programme, but were unspecific, as much the result of radical momentum in the Reich as Hitler’s opportunistic character. Given the multitude of historian interpretations, it seems that a “synthesis” approach, combining “intention” and “structure” is most appropriate. Nazi foreign policy seems to have been affected by “structural determinants” and by “revisionist” forces in the Reich. Decisions were also subject to Hitler’s “intentionalism”, and when possible decisions were often taken opportunistically. However, policies were nevertheless directed always under a general programme based on Hitler’s consistent ideological aims of German hegemony and the acquisition of eastern living-space.

Bibliography

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Fischer, Klaus P. Nazi Germany: A New History. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1995.

Hauner, Milan. “Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January, 1978), 15-32.

Hildebrand, Klaus. The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (Berkley: University of California Press, 1970. Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf – Unexpurgated Two Volume Edition, translated by James Murphy. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1939.

Jarman, T.L. The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany. London: The Cresset Press, 1955. Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris. London: Penguin Books, 2001.

Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis. London: Penguin Books, 2001. Kershaw, Ian. The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. New York: Chapman and Hall, Inc, 1993.

Koch, H.W. “Hitler’s ‘Programme’ and the Genesis of Operation ‘Barbarossa”. The Historical Journal Vol. 26, No. 4 (December, 1983), 891-920.

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Maser, Werner. Hitler’s Mein Kampf: An Analysis translated by R. H. Barry. London: Faber and Company, 1995.

McElligott, Anthony, Tim Kirk, and Ian Kershaw, Working towards the Führer: essays in honour of Sir Ian Kershaw. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.

Rich, Norman. Hitler’s War Aims – Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion. New York: Norton & Company Inc, 1973. Smith, Woodruff. The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Taylor, Alan. The Origins of the Second World War. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961. Turner, Jr., Henry. Nazism and the Third Reich. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972.

Weinberg, Gerhard. The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany – Starting World War II 1937-1939. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970.

1Although this essay is primarily concerned with analyzing pre-war Nazi foreign policy, it will not examine every policy maneuver taken between 1933 and 1939. Such a monumental task would altogether dilute the historiographical analysis central to this paper. Rather, this paper will analyze specific foreign policy aims – and correlative events – in relation to scholarly debate among Third Reich historians. Hitler’s consistent advocacy of war with Soviet Russia will be discussed; however, this paper will not focus on decision-making during the war years. Barring the German invasion of Soviet Russia, policy-based maneuvering during the war was primarily reactionary and largely beyond Hitler’s control; it is, therefore, not exemplary of Nazi foreign policy – opportunistic, programmatic, or otherwise.

2Maurice Baumont, “The Role of Foreign Policy in the Success of the National-Socialist Party,” in, Maurice Baumont, John H. E. Fried, and Edmond Vermeil, The Third Reich (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), 456.

3Norman Rich, “Hitler’s Foreign Policy” in Gordon Martel, The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered (London: Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd, 1986), 130.

4Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (Berkley: University of California Press, 1970), 12.

5T.L. Jarman, The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany (London: The Cresset Press, 1955), 130.

6Rich, “Hitler’s Foreign Policy” in Martel, The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, 130-131.

7Alan Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961), 71-75.

8Woodruff Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 94-97.

9Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (New York: Chapman and Hall, Inc, 1993), 116.

10Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 244.

11Werner Maser, Hitler’s Mein Kampf: An Analysis translated by R. H. Barry (London: Faber and Company, 1995), 141.

12Rich, “Hitler’s Foreign Policy” in Martel, The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, 122-123.

13Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, 250.

14Ibid., 248.

15Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie und Kriegsführung 1940-41 (Frankfurt, 1965), cited in H.W. Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme’ and the Genesis of Operation ‘Barbarossa”, The Historical Journal Vol. 26, No. 4 (December, 1983), 891.

16Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 117.

17Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany – Starting World War II 1937-1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970), 63-74.

18Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 117.

19Christian Leitz, Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933-1941: The Road to Global War (New York: Routledge, 2004),39.

20Ibid., 40.

21Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 117.

22Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, 544-545.

23Ibid., 545.

24Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 118.

25Baumont, “The Role of Foreign Policy in the Success of the National-Socialist Party,” in Baumont, et al., The Third Reich, 471.

26Ibid., 469-470.

27 Milan Hauner, “Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January, 1978),23.

28Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, 38.

29Hauner, “Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January, 1978), 23.

30Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 118-119.

31Ibid., 118.

32Ibid., 110.

33Ibid.

34Maser, Hitler’s Mein Kampf: An Analysis, 135.

35Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf – Unexpurgated Two Volume Edition, translated by James Murphy (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1939), 540-542.

36Maser, Hitler’s Mein Kampf: An Analysis, 118.

37Hauner, “Did Hitler want a World Dominion?,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January, 1978), 23.

38Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie cited in Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 110.

39Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 110.

40Milan Hauner, “The Professionals and the Amateurs in National Socialist Foreign Policy: Revolution and Subversion in the Islamic and Indian World,” in Hirschfeld and Kettenacker, The Führer-State, cited in Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 111.

41Norman Rich, “Hitler’s Foreign Policy” in Gordon Martel, The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered (London: Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd, 1986), 125.

42Maser, Hitler’s Mein Kampf: An Analysis, 141.

43Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 114.

44William Carr, “National Socialism: Foreign Policy and the Wehrmacht” in Walter Laqueur, Fascism: A Reader’s Guide – Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography (Berkley: University of California Press, 1976), 171.

45Kershaw, Hitler Hubris 443-444.

46Louis Franck provides an excellent overview of the economic situation that the Nazis inherited from the Weimar Republic. (Louis R. Franck, “An Economic and Social Diagnosis of National-Socialism” in Maurice Baumont, The Third (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), 539-575.

47Rich, Hitler’s War Aims – Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, 61.

48Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, 445.

49Rich, Hitler’s War Aims – Ideology, The Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, 83-84.

50Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 111.

51Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany – Starting World War II 1937-1939, 657.

52Hauner, “Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January, 1978), 15.

53Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 108.

54Ibid., 111.

55Ibid.

56Rich, “Hitler’s Foreign Policy” in Martel, The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, 124.

57Hans Mommsen, “National Socialism: Continuity and Change” in Laqueur Fascism: A Reader’s Guide – Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography, 179-183.

58Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 121.

59Ibid., 122. 60Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, 585.

61Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 118.

62Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, 585.

63Rich, Hitler’s War Aims – Ideology, The Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, 86.

64Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1995), 411.

65Rich, Hitler’s War Aims – Ideology, The Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, 87.

66Ibid.

67Ibid.

68Rich, Hitler’s War Aims – Ideology, The Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, 90.

69Ibid., 91.

70Ibid., 92-93.

71Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 4.

72Maurice Baumont, “The Role of Foreign Policy in the success of the National-Socialist Party” in Maurice Beaumont, John H.E. Freid, and Edmond Vermeil, The Third Reich (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), 470.

73Maurice Baumont, “The Role of Foreign Policy in the success of the National-Socialist Party” in Maurice Beaumont, John H.E. Freid, and Edmond Vermeil, The Third Reich (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), 470.

74Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis, 4.

75Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany Starting World War II 1937-1939, 142-143.

76Baumont, “The Role of Foreign Policy in the success of the National-Socialist Party” in Beaumont, et al., The Third Reich, 471.

77Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 113.

78Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 113-114.

79Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 113.

80Hildebrand, Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, 45.

81Ibid.

82Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis, 13.

83Rich, Hitler’s War Aims – Ideology, The Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, 88-89.

84Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany – Starting World War II 1937-1939, 263-264. 85Kershaw Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis, 4.

86Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 120.

87Rich, “Hitler’s Foreign Policy” in Martel, The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, 124.

88Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 120.

89David Welch, “’Working towards the Fuhrer’: charismatic leadership and the image of Adolf Hitler in Nazi propaganda,” in Anthony McElligott, Tim Kirk, and Ian Kershaw, Working towards the Führer: essays in honour of Sir Ian Kershaw (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 93.

90Rich, “Hitler’s Foreign Policy” in Martel, The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, 125.

91Ibid.

92Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 110.

93Hidelbrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, 52.

94Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany, 380.

95Rich, Hitler’s War Aims – Ideology, The Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, 109-119.

96T. W. Mason, “The Primacy of Politics – Politics and Economics in National Socialist Germany” in Henry Turner, Jr. Nazism and the Third Reich (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 244.

97Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 126.

98Ibid., 110.

99Ibid., 126-129.

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Originally submitted to:

Professor (Dr.) Bredohl

University of Regina

November 24, 2010